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Abstract
Henderson's hypothesis of the rule of three and four (Henderson,
1979: 90) conjectures that a stable competitive market never has more
than three significant competitors. Henderson observes that the rule
appears to be a good prediction of the results of competition in such
fields as steam turbines, automobiles, baby food, soft drinks, and
airplanes
.
A game theoretic model is formulated which suggests that aggrega-
tion of competitive information and imposition of structural stability
results in an explanation of the rule in a generalized context.
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Introduction
It has been acknowledged (Cunningham and Robertson (1983)) that
certain consulting firms and consultants have contributed in large
measure to the development of the theory of strategic management.
Henderson (1979), the founder of the Boston Consulting Group, has been
active in the formulation of both theory and practice in strategic
management and has contributed many strategic perspectives based mainly
upon his experience and observation of many strategic decision situa-
tions .
Henderson discusses the anatomy of competition in a number of im-
portant contributions (1979: 90), (1983: 7). He stresses the value of
understanding the nature of competitive equilibrium since it provides
a benchmark for the formulation and evaluation of competitive strategy.
In this paper one of Henderson's propositions about competition and
corporate management is examined. Henderson states the Rule of Three
and Four as follows (1979: 90):
A stable competitive market never has more than
three significant competitors, the largest of
which has no more than four times the market share
of the smallest.
Henderson's rule is based upon empirical observation and appears to
fit the results of effective competition in a range of industries.
Henderson (1979: 93) later points out that "a rigorous application
of the Rule of Three and Four would require identification of discrete,
homogeneous market sectors in which all competitors are congruent in
their competition."
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This latter statement could be interpreted in two ways. First
that the three or four significant competitors adopt different strate-
gies. Second, that the three or four significant competitors repre-
sent the three or four viable competitive positions within the industry.
These positions are essentially the basis for the formulation of
strategic groups (Caves and Porter (1977), Porter (1980)).
The main aim of this paper is the development of a game theoretic
model which presents an explanation of the Rule of Three and Four in a
generalized context. The implications of the results are discussed
and some research uses of game theory in identifying strategic groups
are then suggested.
Are There Limits to the Number of Strategic Groups
Strategic groups are defined to be groups of firms that possess or
use similar strategies, i.e., goals and objectives, product-market
competitive positioning, resource allocations and operating policies.
These groups could be within an industry or across industries (Cooper
and Schendel (1971)).
Consider groupings within an industry, say, the beer industry. If
we consider the marketing strategy, each producer tries to differentiate
his own product from the rest of the competitors. For example, Miller
High Life is directed at hard-working blue-collar workers for relaxa-
tion at the end of a tough day; Michelob for those weekends with close
friends. In this instance, the number of strategic groups Is equiva-
lent to the amount of product differentiation possible in that industry.
Levitt (1980) argues that all goods and services are dif ferentiable
—
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even if the generic product is identical, the offered product is dif-
ferentiated. Even though the above argument does not explain why the
product should be differentiated, but rather than it can be, it does
imply that differences in consumers and/or producers may necessitate
product differentiation.
The question then remains whether there is any limit to the number
of strategic groups. The implication in Levitt (1980) is that, poten-
tially, there is none; "only the budget and the imagination limit the
possibilities." On the other hand, oligopolistic forms of market
structures are observed for many stable products, such as automobiles,
steel, toothpaste, etc. Often three or four firms absorb most of the
market share in industries such as turbine-generators (Sultan (1975)).
Schendel and Patton (1978), in their analysis of the beer industry,
choose three hypothesized groupings based on geographic scope, namely
small regional, large regional and national. Aggregating all the
firms into an industry level model produced severe heterogeneity
whereas the geographic grouping was hypothesized to be homogeneous
within groups. Indeed, these persistent differences in industry struc-
ture -lead to relatively few market segments suggesting that there might
be limits to the number of strategic groups.
In the following section, a game theoretic model is formulated
which examines whether there are, in fact, only a limited number of
strategic positions that firms can occupy in an Industry and considers
the stability of these positions.
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A Game Theoretic Formulation
The model assumes that the industry consists of a large number of
firms, each of which produces a single product for the market. Each
firm's product can be differentiated, but it remains a close substi-
tute for the products of other firms. The firms act as monopolists,
as far as their customers are concerned, and set prices; on the other
hand, they compete amongst themselves for the consumer demand since
customers can switch from one firm's product to another's. This eco-
nomic model was posited by Chamberlin to capture the notion of product
differentiation; this market structure falls in between that of pure
competition and pure monopoly, and is aptly named monopolistic com-
petition (Mansfield, Chap. 24 (1974)). The basic elements in the
modelling approach of individual firms used here will be goals/
objectives, means or resource decisions possible and environmental
constraints (Schendel and Patton (1978)).
The model assumes that there is a single objective for each firm,
namely utility maximization. While it is true that there very well
could be a number of goals, often conflicting, that firms operate
under, the contention here is that cost factors could be attributed to
all the key goals and a net utility function could be derived for each
firm. Essentially, the trade-off between, say profit maximization and
market share maximization, can be captured in the utility function.
The actions or resource decisions, that each firm can take, are
made over several controllable variables. These can be strategic and
operating variables. For ease of exposition, only strategic variables
will be allowed to influence the utility function. One of these will
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be the price (P.) that the firm i charges for its product, thus acting
as a monopolist towards its consumers. Two other strategic variables
that will be used are advertising (A.) and material cost (M. ). These
variables were chosen from the table of variables listed for the brew-
ing industry by Schendel and Patton (1978).
The environmental constraints encompass those variables that the
individual firm cannot control even though its decisions may influence
them. These non-controllable variables will be chosen to describe the
competitive nature of the industry. Here, the non-controllable var-
iable used, for exposition's sake, will be the industry average price
(P), the industry average advertising (A) and the industry average
material costs (M) . It should be noted that these variables are the
industrial counterpart to the firm controllable variables. Each firm
takes these variables as given while trying to maximize their utility
function.
Then, in this model, each firm, assumed to be identical, will
maximize its utility function
U(P
i ,
A., M
i
, 7, A, M).
The function U is assumed to be continuously dif ferentiable in all its
variables but not necessarily quasi-concave in its strategic variables
(P., A., M.)« An equilibrium for this game is a set of strategies for
each firm such that the outcome of the game is stable, i.e., in
equilibrium, firm i cannot do any better than using its equilibrium
strategy given that its competitors are playing their equilibrium
strategies. This type of stability concept is called a Cournot-Nash
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equllibrium in economics literature. In particular, symmetric equi-
libria will be examined since a priori all firms have been assumed to
be identical. See the appendix for a more formal definition.
The symmetric equilibrium could be a pure strategy equilibrium in
which case all firms are following the same strategy. Then, there is
only one strategic group consisting of all firms in this equilibrium.
On the other hand, the symmetric equilibrium can be in mixed strategies,
i.e., equilibrium dictates that each firm randomize over some distinct
number of strategies. It is not reasonable nor practical to expect
firms to toss coins in making strategic decisions (and also constantly
changing them) in reality. Then the interpretation of these mixed
strategy equilibria will be that the firms, in the industry, split
into different groups, each group using a distinct strategy specified
by the mixed equilibrium. The proportion of firms in each group will
approximate the probability assessment assigned to the particular
strategy used by the group in the equilibrium.
Intuitively, given a symmetric mixed equilibrium, the firms are
indifferent to the actual choice between any of the strategies in the
2
equilibrium since the utility level associated with each is the same.
The actual allocation of firms to these strategies is not possible at
this level of generality but it is presumed that the prior history of
It should be noted that there could .very well be asymmetric
equilibria for a symmetric game.
2
It is possible for other strategies to have a similar utility
level if the probability associated with these are zero. It will be
assumed that this does not occur, i.e., all the strategies producing
laximal utilities have positive probabilities associated with them.
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the firm will make it gravitate to a specific strategic position. The
point of focus in this research is the question of how large the number
of strategic positions can be in this equilibrium.
Limits to the Number of Strategic Groups
A priori, there is no reason to believe that there is a bound on
the number of strategic positions for the model presented. However,
by imposing the condition of structural stability in the equilibrium
structure, a definite limit on strategic positions emerges.
The notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium intimated a sense of stabil-
ity of the following form: given the parameters of the model, once
every firm is playing its equilibrium strategy, then no firm individ-
ually has any incentive to break away from this equilibrium. The idea
of structural stability argues for yet another sense of stability,
namely: given small shifts in the parameters of the model, Cournot-
Nash equilibrium structure changes only slightly. This sort of
stability ensures that small random fluctuations of the environment
will not make firms change their strategies drastically.
This concept of structural stability is taken from the field of
differential topology in mathematics (Guillerain and Pollack (1974),
Chapters 1 and 2). Its relevance to the model presented here is ob-
vious since, in practice, the utility function, which is the funda-
mental building block, can only be estimated within some non-zero
margin of error. Given snail perturbations in the utility function,
it is important to determine whether the equilibrium, in these per-
turbed models, is similar and close to that in the unperturbed model.
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If so, the equilibrium in the unperturbed model is said to be struc-
turally stable.
To understand how structural stability is maintained, the equi-
librium structure should be examined a little more closely. In the
model, given industry information (P, A, M) , each firm chooses values
for its strategic variables (P., A
,
M ) so as to maximize its utility,
Assume, for the sake of exposition, that the mixed equilibrium has
e * * * * * *
exactly two strategies (P, , A., M, ) and (P~, A- , M~) with the equi-
librium industry variables being (P*, A*, M*). Then, due to their
* * * * * *
optimality, the utility associated with (P.., A., M, ) and (P
? ,
Aj, M~)
given (P*, A*, M*) is exactly the same or, to put it another way, the
difference in the utility functions, at the equilibrium positions, is
zero.
Now perturb the utility function, structurally, by, a very small
amount so as to keep the values of the functions and its derivatives
close to their originally unperturbed values. To ensure stability of
the unperturbed equilibrium, the utility-difference map has to be
checked to ensure that it is well defined and that it assumes a value
of zero close to the unperturbed equilibrium industry information
value of (P~*, ~A*, ¥*).
The model assumptions assure that the utility difference map is
well defined but it is the existence of a value of zero for this map
near (P*, A*, M*) which brings about limitations on the number of
3
The explicit conditions are given in the appendix with mathe-
matical rigor.
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strategic groups. Note that in this example equilibrium, the utility
difference map is a function of the industry information (P, A, M) and
the value it takes is the difference between two strategic positions.
Hence it takes on a single value, i.e., the domain of this map is the
space of values that (P, A, M) can take, i.e., R and the range of the
map is the real line R .
Now suppose there were, in fact, five strategic positions in
equilibrium. Then, the utility difference map would have the same
domain as before but its range would be values in the four dimensional
4
real space R , i.e., it would have to specify values of utility dif-
ferences between the first and second strategic positions, the second
4
and third, the third and fourth and finally the fourth and fifth —
four different values for every value of (P, A, M) . For the original
equilibrium (P*, A*, M*) to be structurally stable, this perturbed
utility difference map has to take on a value equal to zero (in the
four dimensional space) near (P*, A*, M*).
In general, if a map is from a higher dimensional to a lower diraen-
3 1
sional space (R to R as in the first example), then each value that
this nap takes on can be reproduced for some specific perturbation of
this nap. But , when this map is from a lower dimensional to a higher
3 4dimensional space (R to R as in the second example), there exists
some perturbation that misses any and every specified value that the
unperturbed nap takes on. In the present model, the value of the
utility difference nap that is of interest is zero. Mathematically,
4
There is no need to specify the difference between the first and
fifth since It will becone redundant.
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for a two strategy equilibrium, perturbations could take on this value,
but for a five strategy equilibrium, there exists a perturbation which
never takes the value zero. Hence the second example can never be
structurally stable while the first possibly could be.
An intuitive example of this mathematical result is the following:
consider the intersection of straight lines— two lines can intersect
at a point and small perturbations of these lines will still intersect
at a point. On the other hand, let three lines intersect at a point
—
then there is always a small perturbation of these lines such that
these lines do not intersect at a common point. This example shows
that two lines intersecting at a common point is stable but anything
above two is unstable, i.e., the nature of this intersection changes
.
drastically.
This result is stated below as:
Instability Theorem : If the dimension of the industry information »
space (or the uncontrollable variable space) (P, A, M) is three, then
no mixed symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium with more than four
strategies can be structurally stable.
A rigorous proof of this result is given in the appendix.
Discussion of Result
The result implies that if there are three industry information
variables (P, A, M) involved, then the firms cannot split up into more
than four strategic groups, each group differentiating the product
uniquely, in a structurally stable equilibrium. Notice that the re-
sult does not necessarily imply the existence of a stable equilibrium
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with exactly four groups. It is possible to have a product differen-
tiated stable equilibrium with only two groups of firms. Also, an
example could be constructed, within the framework of this model,
which involves more than four groups in equilibrium. However, any
perturbation of the example would destroy the structure of this equi-
librium. Kumar (1981, Chapter 2) has examples of such equilibria
derived from consumer behavior in an economics context. This sub-
stantiates the existence of such equilibria in realistic models and
also that they are not degenerate.
Similar dimensional arguments have been used, with inverted logic,
in the field of multi-dimensional scaling (Churchill (1976), pp. 233-
241). The argument is that given n firms in a product differentiated
market, they can be represented in a (n-1) dimensional attribute space
with no constraints on the relationships between these firms. In a
sense, this reflects the idea that given an industry with four strategy
groups, one can find three factors over which they can be clearly dif-
ferentiated and still retain the independence of each factor. This is
similar to the result here which claims that given three factors
(P, A, M) there can be, at most, four strategic groups in a stable
equilibrium.
Given the instability theorem for this model, a clearly important
problem is how to define the characteristics of the four possible
strategic groups that can occur in a maximally differentiated equi-
librium. This issue, though not formally treated here, can be handled
using the well-known concepts of efficient frontiers and stability.
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Summary and Conclusions
The game theoretic formulation and proof of the validity of
Henderson's conjectures depends upon a number of assumptions made in
the analysis. These are as follows: first, that there are a large
number of competitors in the industry at the outset so that the aggre-
gate statistics that each competitor faces are the same; second, the
notion of stability in the process of industry evolution.
The idea of stability and equilibrium is important from a stra-
tegic management viewpoint. If a particular company in an industry
can predict the equilibrium strategy positions when the industry
matures, then it can adapt its strategy to position itself within one
of the stable strategy positions and thus not drop by the wayside in
any subsequent 'shakeout'. Alternatively, it may attempt to extricate
itself from an unfavorable strategy position assuming an accurate pre-
diction of the positioning of the long-term equilibrium.
The proof in the paper, albeit based upon a simplified model, tends
to confirm Henderson's empirical observations. The vision of mature
industries given by this model is that there are only a few pure stra-
tegies being used by firms in the industry—either there are a few main
firms using different strategies or there are many firms "bunching up"
or grouping around a few distinct strategies. The former is the rule
of 3 or 4 by BCG and the latter is a generalization of the Rule. The
generalization probably narrows to the Rule of 3 and 4 when the fixed
costs to entry are very large.
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Appendix
For the given model, the strategic variables for the firm are
(P., A., M.), the industry information variables are (P, A, M) and the
common utility function facing each firm is
U(P
1
, A
±
,
M
i>
"p,
"A, ¥)
which is continuously dif ferentiable. Each firm maximizes its utility
function over its strategic variables taking the industry information
variables as given.
Definition : A mixed strategy based on k pure strategies is given by
k th((P., A
,
M
,
at ), .) where u is the probability placed on the i
k
strategy (P , A
i
,
M ) with u - ((»-» • • • , ul ) e 0^ S {(y^ ..., u
fc
| E 1^=1}
.
Definition ; The reaction set at (P, A, M) , denoted by R(~P~, A", M) , is
the set of (P., A., M.) which globally maximizes the utility function
at (P~, T, 1?).
Definition : A symmetric mixed strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium based
* * * *k —
on k pure strategies is given by ((P., A , M. , oj ) ._, , P* , A*, M*)
satisfying for all ai = (w ..., oj ) e ft .
k k"- JL JL JL JL ^ AAA
Z w U(P , A., M , P*, A*, M*) > I 0) U(P , A., M. , P*. A*, M*),
1=1 i i l i=1 i i l l
k
^ A k A ^ k A ^
E u .P. = P*, E ui.A. - A*. E u. M. = M*
,
i l i i l i
1-1 1=1 1=1
where w* = (ft^, .... o^) e ^, (P^ A± , M± ) e R(7* , 1* , IT*)
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The above definition implies that there are k strategies
* * * k
(P
,
A., M.) , which are the best responses given (P*, A*, M*) and
that each of these strategies has a corresponding probability to
* *
associated with it. This probability to* = (to , ..., to ) is the one
that gives the highest expected profits compared to all other prob-
ability measures and also satisfies the consistency condition that the
expected or average value of the best response strategy is indeed
(P*. A*, M*).
This equilibrium implies that around a small neighborhood of
(P*, A*, M*), there exist k local maxima and by the assumption of
positive probabilities associated with each utility maximizing
strategy (see footnote 2), they are isolated. Also, the utility
levels at each of these local maxima, at (P*, A*, M*), is the same.
Using notations,
let x
i ~
(p
i'
A
i' V* i=1, •••»
and y = (T, ~A, ~M)
3 k-1
and D: R * R defined by
D(y) = (U(x (y),y) - U(x1+1 (y) ,y)
,
1 — i y I. y • • • * K X ,
x.(y) e S(y),
j=l, ..., k)
where S(y) is the set of local maxima at the point y = (P, A, M)
,
Then, in a small neighborhood of y* = (P*, A*, M* ) , D(y) is well
defined and D(y*) - 0.
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Now consider all perturbations U, of the function U such that the
values of the function U. , its first and second derivatives can be
made as close as needed to those corresponding values of U by choosing
X small enough. To ensure the stability of the equilibrium using profit
function U, it is necessary to demonstrate the existence of a similar
equilibrium, close by and unique in a neighborhood of the original
equilibrium, for all perturbations U, , with X in a some open neighbor-
hood of the value (where it is assumed that U
n
= U) . Three conditions
have to be satisfied for such an existence, namely
(1) the local maxima sets S(y) and S,(y) must be close to each other
in a neighborhood of y* and the cardinality of S,(y) should be
equal to k.
(2) if condition (1) is satisfied, then the profit difference function
D. is well defined in this neighborhood of y*. Then, it is neces-
* _* * *
sary to show the existence of y, = (P. , A., M. ) close to y* , in the
*
neighborhood were D, is defined, such that D,(y,) = 0.
(3) Then it is necessary to ensure the existence of a probability vector
*
w. such that the expected value of the best response strategy
(p
tx'
A
n«
M
tx>
is indeed (V V V-
Condition (1) can be shown to be true through an application of
the implicit function theorem and using the fact that the local maxima
are non-degenerate critical points (Guillerain and Pollack (1974)). It is
the second condition which leads us to the limitation on the value that k
can take.
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Proof of the Instability Theorem :
Consider the case where k > 5. Then, the continuous map D, whose
domain is some compact subset A of the neighborhood of y* and whose
k-1
range is a subset B of R , satisfies D(y*) 0. It should be noted
that D is uniformly continuous and B is a compact set of measure zero
k-1
in R . Now either is on the boundary of set B or not.
If is on the boundary, then there exists a sufficiently small
vector translation D. such that is not contained in the range of
this perturbation D..
If is in the interior of B, then approximate D (which is uni-
formly continuous) uniformly by means of a piecewise continuous linear
function, D. Note that this is a perturbation of D. For this approxi-
mation, Is either in its range or not. If is not in its range,
then this perturbation suffices and let D, = D. If is in its range,
then it must be on its boundary (since D is piecewise linear) and
therefore a sufficiently small vector translation D, of D can get rid
of the in its range.
Thus, we can construct a perturbation D, of D either through pure
vector translation or through a uniform approximation or through a
combination of both, such that no y exists with Di,(y) = 0.
n
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